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Starr: Class Action in a Products Liability Context: The Predomination R

NOTES
CLASS ACTION IN A PRODUCTS LIABILITY
CONTEXT: THE PREDOMINATION
REQUIREMENT AND CAUSE-IN-FACT
"'[Clause-in-fact' . . . is in the end a functional concept designed
to achieve human goals."'1
If followed in other jurisdictions, a recent development in
New York law places the validity of a products liability class action
in serious jeopardy. Section 901(a) of the New York Civil Practice
Law and Rules (CPLR)2 requires that for a class to be certified
"questions of law or fact common to the class . . . [must] predominate over any questions affecting only individual members." 3 In
Rosenfeld v. A.H. Robins Co. ,4 the appellate division held that this
1. Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry
Kalven, Jr., 43 U. Cm. L. REv. 69, 107 (1975).
2. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 901(a) (McKinney 1976). Section 901(a) provides:
a. One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative
parties on behalf of all if:
1. the class is so numerous that joinder of all members, whether otherwise required or permitted, is impracticable;
2. there are questions of law or fact common to the class which predominate over any questions affecting only individual members;
3. the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the
claims or defenses of the class;
4. the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class; and
5. a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and
efficient adjudication of the controversy.

id.
3. Id. § 901(a)(2). Such a "predomination requirement" exists in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3), and in most state class action statutes, see, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1781(b)(2) (West 1973); DEL. CT. CH. R. 23(b)(3);
Omio R. Civ. P. 23(B)(3).
4. 63 A.D.2d 11, 407 N.Y.S.2d 196 (2d Dep't), appeal dismissed, 46 N.Y.2d
731, 385 N.E.2d 1301, 413 N.Y.S.2d 374 (1978). Motion by plaintiff-appellant for leave
to appeal to the court of appeals pursuant to N.Y. CIV. FRAC. LAw
5602(b)(1)
(McKinney 1978), was granted by the Second Department on September 7, 1978.
N.Y.L.J., Sept. 13, 1978, at 14, col. 1. However, the court of appeals dismissed the
appeal on the grounds that: (1) The decision below was a discretionary one and,
therefore, the question certified by the appellate division's permissive appeal did not
859
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predomination requirement could be satisfied only in those cases in
which the issue of cause-in-fact is capable of resolution on a
classwide basis. 5 The court further suggested that in almost all
products cases cause-in-fact must be resolved on an individual, not
a classwide basis. 6 Thus, Rosenfeld implies 7 that class action is
seldom appropriate in a products liability suit.
This Note suggests that the issue of cause-in-fact need not
prevent satisfaction of the predomination requirement in most
instances, and that consequently products liability class actions
ordinarily should be possible. First, a general approach to the
predomination requirement is summarized. This approach is then
applied to both strict liability and breach of warranty causes of action, paying special attention to the issue of whether cause-in-fact
can be established on a classwide basis. Finally, the propriety of a
class action with respect to only particular issues in a products
case, pursuant to section 906(1) of the CPLR, 8 is discussed.
I.

ROSENFELD V. A.H. ROBINS CO.

Rosenfeld involved a manufacturer's liability for injuries allegedly caused by its product, an intrauterine device (IUD) known as
present "a question of law decisive of the correctness of the determination of the Appellate Division," as required by N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 5713 (McKinney 1978), and
(2) the appeal taken as a matter of right pursuant to N.Y. CIV. PRAc. LAw § 5601(a)
(McKinney 1978) was improper because denial of class certification is not a final
determination within the meaning of the New York Constitution. Rosenfeld v. A.H.
Robins Co., 46 N.Y.2d 731, 385 N.E.2d 1301, 413 N.Y.S.2d 374 (1978). See generally
Hoenig, Products Liability: Recent Developments, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 24, 1979, at 1, col.
1; Newman, Review of Class Actions by Court of Appeals, N.Y.LJ., Feb. 15, 1979,
at 1, col. 1. "The upshot of this procedural history is that the Appellate Division may
effectively be the 'court of last resort' regarding the preliminary issue of class certification until the full merits of the case are finally determined." Hoenig, supra, at 3,
col. 2.
5. See 63 A.D.2d at 16, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 199.
6. See id. at 15-16, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 198-99. The sole exception appears to be
mass accident cases where there is indisputably a common cause-in-fact. See id.
7. Class actions in other substantive areas of the law may also be jeopardized
by this development. See Wojciechowski v. Republic Steel Corp., 67 A.D.2d 830, 413
N.Y.S.2d 70 (4th Dep't 1979) (class certification denied, in part because whether dust
from defendant's plant cause-in-fact of plaintiffs' property damage held to be question requiring individual determinations) (citing Rosenfeld v. A.H. Robins Co., 63
A.D.2d 11, 407 N.Y.S.2d 196 (2d Dep't), appeal dismissed, 46 N.Y.2d 731, 385 N.E.
2d 1301, 413 N.Y.S.2d 374 (1978)).
8. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 906(1) (McKinney 1976). Section 906 provides:
"When appropriate, (1) an action may be brought or maintained as a class action with
respect to particular issues, or (2) a class may be divided into subclasses and each
subclass treated as a class. The provisions of this article shall then be construed and
applied accordingly." Id. § 906. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4).
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the Dalkon Shield. The plaintiff, Doris Rosenfeld, purchased a
Dalkon Shield and had it implanted by her gynecologist. Several
years later she was hospitalized and treated for uterine infection,
uterine abscessing, and related bleeding. She alleged that these injuries resulted from the IUD and that such injuries necessitated a

hysterectomy. 9 Further, she alleged that the shield was defectively

designed10 and that the defendant breached certain express and
implied warranties with regard to it..' The suit was brought by
Rosenfeld individually and as a representative party of the class of

all those similarly situated. 12 Plaintiff predicated the manufacturer's
liability on four distinct legal theories: (1) Strict liability,' 3 (2)
breach of express warranty, 14 (3) breach of implied warranty of

9. Plaintiff's Amended Verified Complaint at 11-12, Rosenfeld v. A.H. Robins
Co., No. 77-3794 (Nassau County Ct. Nov. 30, 1977), aff'd, 63 A.D.2d 11, 407
N.Y.S.2d 196 (2d Dep't), appeal dismissed, 46 N.Y.2d 731, 385 N.E.2d 1301, 413
N.Y.S.2d 374 (1978).
10. Id. at 12, 16. Plaintiff alleged three design defects: (1) the device was defectively molded of an overrigid substance which had "an inherent and latent dangerous tendency to cause a shearing between the endometrium and the chonioamnion"; (2) the device tended to erode causing perforation of the uterine wall; (3)
the unique design of "a single tail with bundled monofilaments ... enclosed within
a thin plastic sheath" resulted in the aggregation of harmful bacteria and consequent
infections. Plaintiff's Bill of Particulars at A118-19 app., Rosenfeld v. A.H. Robins
Co., No. 77-3794 (Nassau County Ct. Nov. 30, 1977) (citations omitted), aff'd, 63
A.D.2d 11, 407 N.Y.S.2d 196 (2d Dep't), appeal dismissed, 46 N.Y.2d 731, 385
N.E.2d 1301, 413 N.Y.S.2d 374 (1978).
11. As part of its marketing program, Robins advertised intensively in medical
journals. Plaintiff alleged that Robins misrepresented the IUD's safety and suitability
in these advertisements and in its catalogues. Plaintiff's Amended Verified Complaint, supra note 9, at 10-11, 13-15.
12. Plaintiff sought certification of the following limited class:
All patients of gynecologists or of clinics under the supervision of gynecologists within the State of New York in whom Defendant's IUD's were implanted, during the time period June 12, 1970 (the date on which ROBINS
acquired the patents on the IUD at issue) through June 28, 1974 (the date
upon which Defendant first withdrew the subject IUD from public marketing) and which patients' IUD's malfunctioned, failed, or operated in such a
manner, during the time period June 12, 1970 through November 23, 1976
(the date of service of Plaintiff's Complaint), so as to require their hospitalization for treatment of maladies or other physical manifestations which had
as symptoms thereof all forms of pelvic infection, uterine abscessing and/or
perforation, and related or incidental hemorrhaging.
Id. at 5-6.
13. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 3, Rosenfeld v. A.H. Robins Co., 63 A.D.2d
11, 407 N.Y.S.2d 196 (2d Dep't), appeal dismissed, 46 N.Y.2d 731, 385 N.E.2d 1301,
413 N.Y.S.2d 374 (1978). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A
(1965).
14. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 13, at 3. See generally N.Y.U.C.C. §
2-313 (McKinney 1964).
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merchantability, 15 and (4) negligence. 16
17
The appellate division affirmed the order of special term
denying class certification because the section 901(a)(2) require-

ment that common elements predominate had not been met.

8

The

court distinguished the issue of damages from the issue of liability:
They held that it was not the need for individual determination of
damages that prevented common elements from predominating, 19
but the need for individual determination of liability. 2 0 The appellate division found that in Rosenfeld classwide resolution of liability
was impossible because proof of causation required individual determinations. 2 1 With respect to the strict liability claim, the court
held that each class member would have to prove individually that
the defect(s) in the Dalkon Shield was the cause-in-fact of her injuries. 2 2 With respect to the breach of warranty claim, each member
would have to prove individually that she had detrimentally relied
on the false representations. 2 3 Whether phrased in terms of causein-fact or reliance, the fundamental focus of the court's concern was

identical: The causal link between conduct of the defendant and
injury suffered by a class member had to be established on an individual basis. Therefore, liability was not capable of classwide resolution.
15. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 13, at 3. See generally N.Y.U.C.C. §
2-314 (McKinney 1964).
16. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 13, at 3.
17. Rosenfeld v. A.H. Robins Co., No. 77-3794 (Nassau County Ct. Nov. 30,
1977), aff'd, 63 A.D.2d 11, 407 N.Y.S.2d 196 (2d Dep't), appeal dismissed, 46 N.Y.2d
731, 385 N.E.2d 1301, 413 N.Y.S.2d 374 (1978).
18. Although special term indicated that the § 901(a)(5) requirement of superiority, N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAV § 901(a)(5) (McKinney 1976), was also unsatisfied,
Rosenfeld v. A.H. Robins Co., No. 77-3794, slip op. at 2-3 (Nassau County Ct. Nov.
30, 1977), aff'd, 63 A.D.2d 11, 407 N.Y.S.2d 196 (2d Dep't), appeal dismissed, 46
N.Y.2d 731, 385 N.E.2d 1301, 413 N.Y.S.2d 374 (1978), this requirement was not discussed by the appellate division. In any event, it is preferable to view the superiority requirement, which encompasses considerations of judicial economy, or administrative costs, as part of the predomination requirement, rather than as a separate
criterion. See Developments in the Law-Class Actions, 89 HAV. L. REV. 1318,
1498-1504 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Class Actions]. See notes 36, 64 & 141 infra
for discussion of the judicial economy criterion.
19. 63 A.D.2d at 16, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 199.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. According to the court, "[tihe injuries may have resulted from a variety
of factors completely unrelated to the use of the Dalkon Shield, including, perhaps,
the peculiarities of her individual physique or the negligent conduct of the user or
her physician." Id. at 17, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 199 (emphasis in original).
23. Id. at 16, 18-20, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 199-201. The statute of limitations and contributory negligence are other issues mentioned by the court requiring individual determination. Id. at 16-17, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 199.
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The appellate division also considered permitting class action
with respect to only particular issues, referred to as "partial class
action." Though this mechanism is permitted under section
906(1),24 the court held that its use in Rosenfeld would be improper2 5 for two reasons: First, those factual issues that could be
determined on a class basis2 6 were "thoroughly intertwined with
those which must be determined individually,"'2 7 and, second, "the
judicial economy to be reaped and the advantages for litigants of a
28
partial class action [were] relatively small."
The Rosenfeld decision is likely to have significant repercussions. If the court's rationale is followed, its practical effect will be
to restrict severely the use of class action suits in products liability
causes of action. However, products cases are often extremely expensive undertakings; victims with legal injuries of less than
$25,000 find that the substantial fixed litigation costs pose an insurmountable barrier to effective prosecution of their claims on an individual basis. 2 9 Thus, the ultimate result of Rosenfeld may be that
innumerable consumers who suffer significant personal injury as
a result of a defective product will be denied a viable judicial
remedy.
These potentially far-reaching effects justify a careful review
of the predomination requirement in the context of a products liability case. Few courts have taken an approach to this requirement
beyond that of a "rough pragmatism": 30 Predomination is determined on no more than a belief that a "goodly proportion of what
24.
25.
26.

For the text of § 906(1), see note 8 supra.
63 A.D.2d at 20, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 201.
These include: "(1) the existence of a defect or defects in the Dalkon

Shield, (2) the nature of the representations and warranties made with respect to the
device and (3) whether the warranties and representations were false." Id. at 16, 407
N.Y.S.2d at 199.
27. Id. at 20, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 201.
28. Id.
29. See Schwartz, Foreword: Understanding Products Liability, 67 CALIF. L.
REV. 435, 464-65 (1979). But see Weinstein, Revision of Procedure: Some Problems
in Class Actions, 9 BUFFALO L. REV. 433, 469 (1960). See also Rosenfeld v. A.H.
Robins Co., 63 A.D.2d at 27, 29, 32, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 206, 207, 209 (Shapiro, J., dissenting); Rabin, Dealing with Disasters: Some Thoughts on the Adequacy of the Legal System, 30 STAN. L. REV. 281, 295 (1978); Note, The Products Liability Class
Suit: Preventive Relieffor the Consumer, 27 S.C. L. REV. 229, 229 (1975).
30. Landers, Of Legalized Blackmail and Legalized Theft: Consumer Class Actions and the Substance-Procedure Dilemma, 47 S.CAL. L. REV. 842, 862 (1974).
See, e.g., Entin v. Barg, 17 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 689 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Frankel v. Wyllie &
Thornhill, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 330 (W.D. Va. 1972). See generally 7A C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1778 (1972).
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appears to be the overall dispute" 3 ' is or is not capable of classwide
determination. 32 A more refined analysis is needed and a primary
object of this Note is to provide one.
II.

GENERAL APPROACH TO THE PREDOMINATION
REQUIREMENT: A SUBSTANTIVE THEORY OF CLASS ACTIONS

The issue of predomination cannot be properly analyzed outside the context of some general theory of the class suit. 3 3 Of the
theories commonly advanced, a compelling argument has been
made that the "substantive theory" 34 provides the most satisfactory
approach to the contemporary class action suit. 3 5 The substantive
theory maintains as its basic premise that the most significant function of contemporary class actions is to open courts to claims not
ordinarily litigated because they are not economically feasible. 36
This function is achieved by "aggregating substantially similar
claims, thereby prorating the cost of litigation among numerous litigants." 3 7 The increased access to courts made possible by the class
suit is itself justified, according to the substantive approach, because it promotes full realization of substantive policy objectives
underlying the claims sought to be enforced in the class suit. 38
From the perspective of the substantive theory, predomination
of common elements of law or fact is not, in itself, a criterion for
class certification; rather, it is a conclusion that other criteria have
been met. At the first level of analysis, the question is whether
certifying the class furthers all of the policies underlying the substantive law upon which that claim is based. 39 This inquiry, which
may be termed the "substantive compatibility analysis," is subdivided because there are two types of policies-remedial and
31. Landers, supra note 30, at 862.
32. In deciding the predomination question, methods of handling the remaining individual questions and the effect of these methods on substantive policies
have received little attention. See id.
33. See Class Actions, supra note 18, at 1330.
34. Id. at 1331.
35. See id. at 1329-72 (isolating and comparing three theories of class action
suits).
36. Id. at 1353-54. See Kalven & Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of
the Class Suit, 8 U. Cm. L. REv. 684 (1941). It is this premise which suggests the error of using judicial economy as an independent criterion for determining class certification. If without class actions there will be no litigation, judicial economy will tilways operate to bar class actions. See Class Actions, supra note 18, at 1505.
37. Class Actions, supra note 18, at 1322.
38. Id. at 1359.
39. See id.
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structural-that must be taken into account.40 Remedial policies
concern the overall purposes served by the law authorizing the
cause of action. Among these are deterring wrongful conduct,
compensating injured persons, and forcing disgorgement of unjust
enrichment. 4 1 Structural policies center on the separate elements
of a cause of action and on the method by which required elements
may be proved. 42 Sometimes a particular element of a cause of action can be established by a general mode of proof-such as statistical data-which is not dependent on the particular circumstances
of each class member, but rather is applicable to all class members
alike. At other times only a specific mode of proof, that is, proof
necessitating separate inquiry into the situation of each class member, is appropriate. If the elements of a cause of action are all capable of being proved by general modes of proof, then class action is
compatible with structural policies.
The substantive propriety of a class suit turns not only on the
compatibility of class procedures with the remedial and structural
policies of the particular cause of action but also on the effect of
class action on the interaction between the two types of substantive
43
policies.
If this analysis of the compatibility of class action procedures
with the substantive policies of the underlying cause of action leads
to the conclusion that the two are fully compatible, then it should
be found that common questions of law or fact do predominate
over individual questions. However, if full substantive compatibility does not exist, 44 common questions may, nevertheless, be
found to predominate after proceeding to a second-level analysis
-the "substantive predomination analysis."
The primary consideration of substantive predomination analysis is whether a class action will achieve a fair balance among the
social values sought to be advanced by the substantive law on
which the cause of action is based. 4 5 Even though substantive compatibility in a particular case is lacking because the achievement of
40. Id. at 1360.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1361-65. For discussion of the interaction of structural and remedial
policies, see text accompanying notes 116-124 infra.
44. When full substantive compatibility does not exist it is usually for the reason that individual modes of proof are required to establish certain elements of the
cause of action. See Class Actions, supra note 18, at 1360.
45. See id. at 1505, 1511-12.
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one of the policy objectives of the cause of action is impaired by a
class suit, it may be that the value(s) associated with that objective
ought, in fairness, to remain to some extent unsatisfied in order to
promote other values more deserving of judicial protection. The
value(s) whose realization is hindered by allowing the class action
suit must be weighed against the value(s) whose realization is advanced. If permitting the class action achieves a fair balance among
the social values underlying the claim upon which the suit is
brought, the class suit is "substantively fair," and the predomination requirement should be considered satisfied.
III.

THE SUBSTANTIVE APPROACH IN A
PRODUCTS LIABILITY CONTEXT

Resolving the predomination issue in a products liability context requires, first, an analysis of the remedial policies of products
liability causes of action to ascertain if these policies are furthered
by class suits. Second, it requires an analysis of structural policies
to ascertain whether general modes of proof suffice for each element of the cause of action. Third, it requires an analysis of the interaction between these remedial and structural policies. After considering substantive compatibility, there follows an examination of
substantive predomination. The structural policy analysis of the
substantive compatibility section focuses on cause-in-fact. A primary aim is to demonstrate that this element is capable of being
established by general modes of proof.
A.

Substantive Compatibility

1. Remedial Policies: Protection Against Defective Products
and Defective Communications.-In the products liability context,
remedial policies focus on two distinct concerns: Defective and unreasonably dangerous products,4

6

and misrepresentations or omis-

sions in communications about a product. 4 7 The defectiveproduct/defective-communication distinction is helpful in revealing
46. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d 436,
440 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A
(1965).
47. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402B (1965). See generally Green,
Strict Liability Under Sections 402A and 402B: A Decade of Litigation, 54 TEx. L.
REv. 1185, 1189-91 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Green, Strict Liability]; Green, The

Communicative Torts, 54 TEX. L. REv. 1 (1975); Shapo, A RepresentationalTheory
of Consumer Protection: Doctrine, Function and Legal Liabilityfor Product Disap-

pointment, 60 VA. L. REv. 1109 (1974).
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significant remedial policy nuances that are of crucial importance
for structural policy goals.

(a) Remedial Policies and the Defective-Product Concern.Broadly speaking, the primary purposes of products liability law
are compensation and deterrence. 48 The goals are (1) to compensate individuals for personal injury or loss of property resulting
from a defective product, thereby reducing social dislocations resulting from this type of accident, 49 and (2) to deter manufacturers
and retailers, by means of an economic incentive, from introducing
such products into the marketplace, thereby reducing the number
and severity of accidents. 50
Compensation and deterrence goals can be further analyzed.
Compensation, the reduction of societal costs resulting from accidents, can be achieved by loss spreading and by wealth distribution (the "deep pocket" method). 51 There is loss spreading in products cases because injury burdens are spread, in the form of higher
prices, among all purchasers of a product. 52 There is wealth distriwho are potentially
bution because from among a group of parties
53
liable, that party best able to pay is selected.
48. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d
436, 440-41 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring); G. CALABRESi, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 26-27 (1970); Calabresi, supra note 1, at 73; Calabresi, The Decisionfor Accidents: An Approach to Nonfault Allocation of Costs, 78 HARv. L. REv. 713, 713
(1965). See generally, Whitford, Strict Products Liability and the Automobile Industry: Much Ado About Nothing, 1968 Wisc. L. REV. 83, 92-93. According to Professor
Calabresi, the principal goals of any system of accident law are, first, to be just, and,
second, to reduce the costs of accidents. G. CALABRESI, supra, at 25. Calabresi divides the second goal into three subgoals: (1) Primary reduction of accident costs,
the reduction of the number and severity of accidents, referred to in this Note as deterrence, (2) secondary reduction of accident costs, the reduction of societal costs resulting from accidents, referred to in this Note as compensation, and (3) tertiary reduction of accident costs, the reduction of administrative costs incurred in our
treatment of accidents. Id. at 26-31.
49. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377
P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,
32 N.J. 358, 379-80, 161 A.2d 69, 81 (1960).
50. See, e.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d
436, 440-41 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,
32 N.J. 358, 380-84, 161 A.2d 69, 81-83 (1960).
51. G. CALABRESI, supra note 48, at 39-41; Calabresi, supra note 48, at 714. See
generally G. CALABRESI, supra note 48, at 36-67; Calabresi, supra note 1, at 73-77.
52. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436,
441 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A,

comment c at 349 (1965); Whitford, supra note 48, at 93.
53. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436,
441 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring) (manufacturer best situated to afford protection
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Deterrence, the reduction of the number and severity of acci-

dents, can be achieved by "collective deterrence," 54 "market deterrence," 55 or a mixed system. 56 Each type of deterrence represents
a method of "creating incentives so that people will avoid those future injuries worth avoiding and thus achieve an optimal trade-off
between safety and injury in a world where safety is not a free

good, and hence injury is not a total bad." 57 Under collective deterrence the optimal trade-offs are achieved by society's collective

determination of which acts, activities, or products are too dangerous to be permitted. Market deterrence, in contrast, leaves the determination to "an infinity of atomistic, individual market decisions." 58
In products liability the injury costs of an unreasonably dangerous product are allocated to the activity of manufacturing it, and
it is left to the market mechanism to decide if the activity is

worthwhile despite its injury costs. 59 For example, if after
increasing the price of a product to include the costs of injuries attributed to its use, the product can still be marketed at an acceptagainst risk of injuries caused by defective product); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 402A, comment c at 349 (1965).
54. See generally G. CALABRESI, supra note 48, at 95-113; Calabresi, supra
note 1, at 78-84.
55. See generally G. CALABREsi, supra note 48, at 68-94; Calabresi, supra note
1, at 84-91.
56. See generally G. CALABRESI, supra note 48, at 113-29.
57. Calabresi, supra note 1, at 77 (footnote omitted).
58. Id. at 84.
59. Although there is an aspect of collective deterrence as well as market deterrence in products cases, see G. CALABaESI, supra note 48, at 95 ("[W]henever accident costs are valued in relation to which activity causes them, a collective decision
is implied ....
"), for convenience, products liability is treated in this Note as
predominately a system of market deterrence. If it were to be treated as a system of
collective deterrence, a parallel argument could be made. Indeed, the argument
would be stronger.
It should be noted that products liability, as a system of market deterrence, can
be criticized for failing to achieve optimal deterrence. See generally G. CALABRESI,
supra note 48, at 244-65. This is in part because it fails to allocate costs in all instances to the "cheapest cost avoider"--to that party who can most effectively choose
whether avoidance is cheaper than bearing injury costs. See generally id. at 135-73.
Nevertheless, as between manufacturers of unreasonably dangerous products that
cause injury and consumers of those products, manufacturers are likely to be the
cheapest cost avoiders. Calabresi & Bass, Right Approach, Wrong Implications: A
Critique of McKean on Products Liability, 38 U. Cm. L. REv. 74, 87-88 (1970). See
generally G. CALABREsI, supra note 48, at 136-39. Moreover, to the extent that we
are concerned with secondary reduction of accident costs, it is advisable in a close
case to choose the manufacturer rather than the consumer as the cheapest cost
avoider. Calabresi & Bass, supra, at 89-90.
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able profit, the manufacturer can be expected to do so. Alternatively, adding injury costs to the cost of production may price
the product out of the market. 60 Of course, if it ultimately is
cheaper to introduce a safety device than to pay for injuries resulting from the same product without a safety device, the manufacturer can be expected to make a safer product. In this manner
market deterrence promotes both greater product safety and increased consumer protection. Obviously, for market deterrence to
be effective the price of the product must accurately reflect its total
injury costs.
These remedial policies are furthered by class actions. Because
the cost of individualized litigation prevents "[clountless meritorious products liability complaints," 61 allowing injured persons access
to courts through the less expensive class procedures means that
they will have an opportunity to receive compensation which
would otherwise be denied them. And, on the assumption that
those who suffer injury from defective products are not likely to be
better loss spreaders or to have deeper pockets than manufacturers
or retailers, societal costs of accidents will be reduced. Thus, class
actions advance the compensation goal of products liability law.
Permitting class actions will also increase market deterrence
since class procedures enable injury costs allocated to manufacturing and retailing activities to reflect more accurately those costs
that should be so allocated. In the absence of class action, the expense of individual litigation enables manufacturers to escape responsibility for those injuries that are caused by their unreasonably
dangerous products but are too minor to make individual litigation
feasible. 6 2 This means that these injury costs are not allocated to
the appropriate activity, and market deterrence is correspondingly
weakened. In contrast class actions will force manufacturers to include all relevant injury costs6 3 in determining the optimal tradeoff between safety and injury, instead of only those serious enough
to warrant litigation on a case-by-case basis. Market deterrence will
60.

See Calabresi, supra note 48, at 717-18. "A manufacturer is free to employ a

process even if it occasionally kills or maims if he is able to show that consumers
want his product badly enough to enable him to compensate those he injures and
still make a profit." Id. at 717.
61. Note, supra note 29, at 229. See generally sources cited note 29 supra and
accompanying text
62. See Note, supra note 29, at 248.
63. Certain types of noneconomic damages are not normally treated as costs.
Calabresi, supra note 48, at 721-24. See generally G. CALABREsI, supra note 48, at
198-229.
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be correspondingly strengthened, and product safety and consumer
protection will be correspondingly promoted.64

(b) Remedial Policies and the Defective-Communication Concern.-Remedial policy goals relating to defective communications
vary with each of three subcategories. These subcategories are
breach of express warranty,6 5 breach of implied warranty of
67
merchantability, 66 and failure to warn.

Arguably, in holding a manufacture liable for breach of express
warranty the objective is to protect the reasonable expectations of
consumers rather than to deter manufacturers from making affirmations about their products that may turn out to be false. As long as
the reasonable expectations of a particular plaintiff-consumer are
not defeated, the argument goes, there is no reason to restrict representations made to the public concerning the character or quality
of the product. Yet others insist that false representations constitute a "fraud on the market" and that the goal of a breach of ex68
press warranty action is, in large part, to deter such fraud.
64. For the sake of simplicity, discussion of the goal of justice and the subgoal
of reduction of administrative costs, see note 48 supra, is omitted from text. On the
premise that class actions open courts to claims not otherwise litigated, see note 36
supra and accompanying text, administrative costs are increased by these actions.
Yet, this increase must be balanced against the decrease in the primary and secondary costs of accidents that also occurs. With respect to the goal of justice, it could be
argued that a successful class action places injury costs on those parties who benefit
most from the activity that is a primary cause of those costs. Thus class action is
fairer than procedures that leave the costs on innocent victims. See Whitford, supra
note 48, at 92-93.
65. U.C.C. § 2-313; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402B (1965). See, e.g.,

Crocker v. Winthrop Labs., 514 S.W.2d 429, 433 (Tex. 1974). See generally A.
WEINSTEIN, A. TWERSKI, H. PIEHLER & W. DONAHER, PRODUCTS LIABILrTY AND
THE REASONABLY SAFE PRODUCT 11-12 (1978) [hereinafter cited as WEINSTEIN &
TNVEBSKI]; J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, 'UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 9-2 to -5

(1972).
66. U.C.C. § 2-314. See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J.
358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). See generally J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 65, 9
9-6 to -8.

67. See, e.g., Tucson Indus., Inc. v. Schwartz, 15 Ariz. App. 166, 487 P.2d 12
(1971); Crocker v. Winthrop Labs., 514 S.W.2d 429, 432-33 (Tex. 1974); Muncy v.
Magnolia Chem. Co., 437 S.W.2d 15 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968). See generally WEINSTEIN
& TWESKI, supra note 65, at 40-42; Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, The
Use and Abuse of Warnings in Products Liability-Design Defect Litigation Comes
of Age, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 495 (1976).
68. See sources cited note 85 infra and accompanying text. Cf. Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 907 (9th Cir. 1975) (purchaser on stock exchange defrauded when
market price set invalidly); Reeder v. Mastercraft Elecs. Corp., 363 F. Supp. 574, 581
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) (price of stock artificially inflated by misrepresentation); Siegel v.
Realty Equities Corp., 54 F.R.D. 420, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (fraud on market when
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In contrast to the considerations involved in an express warranty, those involved in an implied warranty of merchantability
have little to do with the expectations of the individual consumer.
Theoretically, a warranty is implied "because the manufacturer
holds himself out as being skilled in the construction of his products and as being able to manufacture them without latent defects
in materials or workmanship." 6 9 But whether a particular consumer, much less a third party, expects the product to be without
defects, i.e., "fit for its ordinary uses," 70 is irrelevant. 71 The real

purpose of the implied warranty is not protection of expectations
but prevention of and compensation for injuries caused by unrea72
sonably dangerous products.
The policy objectives of the failure-to-warn category are more
complex. In some cases warnings are required to decrease the inherent risk of injury. 7 3 Since a failure to warn in these cases may
market value of publicly traded stock artificially inflated because of misrepresentation). But see Strauss v. Long Island Sports, Inc., 60 A.D.2d 501, 508-10, 401
N.Y.S.2d 233, 237-38 (2d Dep't 1978) (fraud on market theory rejected in express
warranty cause of action).
69. Vitro Corp. of America v. Texas Vitrified Supply Co., 71 N.M. 95, 106, 376
P.2d 41, 49 (1962) (citing Kellogg Bridge Co. v. Hamilton, 110 U.S. 108 (1884)). See
Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 429-30, 573 P.2d 443, 454, 143 Cal. Rptr.
225, 236 (1978).
70. See U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(c).
71. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 65, § 9-6, at 286 (reliance not included among elements required under U.C.C. § 2-314). See generally Barker v. Lull
Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978) (rejecting suggestions that sole criterion for recovery in products liability action is if product more
dangerous than expected by average consumer). Caution must be exercised to distinguish the actual expectations of a particular consumer from the supposed expectations of an average or ordinary consumer. It is only the former that are irrelevant in
an implied warranty of merchantability action. The latter are relevant, though only
marginally: They function as an objective minimum standard that a product must
meet to avoid being found defective and therefore unmerchantable. Id. at 425 n.7,
430, 573 P.2d 451 n.7, 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. 233 n.7, 236. Thus, a finding that defendant has met consumer expectations does not preclude liability. Twerski, From Defect
to Cause to Comparative Fault-Rethinking Some Product Liability Concepts, 60
MARQ. L. REv. 296, 311-13 (1977). For discussion of the consumer expectations
standard, see Schwartz, supra note 29, at 471-81.
72. See Davis v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 126 (9th Cir. 1968); Goldberg
v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 436-37, 191 N.E.2d 81, 82-83, 240
N.Y.S.2d 592, 594-95 (1963); 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 28.20
(1956); WEINSTEIN & TWERSKI, supra note 65, at 10 ("[Tlhere is general agreement

that Section 2-314, which defines an implied warranty of merchantability, provides
the same consumer protection as the Restatement requirement that a product be reasonably safe."); J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 65, § 9-6, at 286.
73. See WEINSTEIN & TWERSKI, supra note 65, at 60-64; Twerski, Weinstein,
Donaher & Piehler, supra note 67, at 500-05.
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make the product unreasonably dangerous, the goals of the cause
of action are the same as in any defective-product case. In other instances warnings are required not to make the product reasonably
safe but to enable the consumer to make an intelligent decision
whether to use the product.7 4 The harm that the cause of action
protects against in these instances is not injury from a defective
product but deprivation of the consumer's interest in making a
choice based on full disclosure of all risk-potential information. 75
The remedial policy goal behind a failure-to-warn case is thus either product safety or informed consent, depending on the type of
warning at issue.
Class actions further the remedial policies associated with defective communications in the same manner and to the same extent
that they further the remedial policies associated with defective
products. 76 On the assumption that many who now suffer injuries
caused by defective communications are prevented from obtaining
recovery by the high cost of litigation, it follows that the less expensive class action procedures would enable them to receive compensation and, in so doing, would allocate the cost of injury to the
appropriate activity.
2. Structural Policies: Reliance and Cause-in-Fact.-The elements required to make out a case in products liability differ depending upon whether the action is based on breach of warranty,
strict liability, or negligence. But regardless of the theory upon
which suit is brought, full substantive compatibility of class action
with the structural policies of products liability law is achieved only
if each element of the cause of action is capable of demonstration
by general modes of proof. This Note, however, does not examine
all elements of products liability causes of action. Rather, it focuses
on the cause-in-fact element. The thesis of this section is thus:
Where the substantive law imposes an obligation on plaintiffs to
prove that a product or communication defect is the cause-in-fact of
their injury, that obligation can ordinarily be met by general
modes of proof.
74. WEINSTEIN & TwERsiai, supra note 65, at 64-68; Twerski, Weinstein,
Donaher & Piehler, supra note 67, at 517-21; Twerski, Old Wine in a New
Flask-RestructuringAssumption of Risk in the Products Liability Era, 60 IoWA L.
REv. 1, 43-48 (1974). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment k at
353 (1965).
75. See Davis v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 129 (9th Cir. 1968) (polio vaccine marketable only if accompanied by "full disclosure of the existence and the ex-

tent of the risk involved"); Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, supra note 67, at
519; Twerski, supra note 74, at 46.

76. See generally text accompanying notes 61-64 supra.
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In general, whether a particular element should be required
for a cause of action and, if required, whether it can be appropriately established by a general mode of proof depend upon
whether, on balance, the underlying policy objectives of the cause
of action would be advanced. 7 7 What follows is an application of
this general statement to the elements of reliance and cause-infact.
(a) The Reliance Element.-In a cause of action involving a
defective communication, reliance is the surrogate for cause-in-fact.
Whether the plaintiff should be required to prove that the misrepresentation or omission was actually relied upon and, if so, whether
reliance can be established by general modes of proof are determined only by referring to the remedial policy goals of the particular category of defective communication involved. 78 For example,
to the extent that a breach of express warranty action has as its
predominate and overriding objective protection of actual consumer expectations and compensation for their defeat, courts may
justifiably insist that actual reliance on the misrepresentation be established and that it be established only by individual modes of
proof. However, if the goal of protecting the integrity of the
marketplace is viewed as more important than protecting buyers'
expectations, courts should be less strict in their approach to the
reliance element. General methods of proof would be proper in or79
der to realize the more important policy goal at stake.
It is for just such reasons that the reliance requirement has
been relaxed in private actions under federal securities laws. In
these cases courts have held that a major policy objective of the
cause of action is to protect the integrity of the marketplace by
deterring the artificial inflation of securities prices caused by material misrepresentations. 80 It is argued that although a purchaser on
77. See Class Actions, supra note 18, at 1506-11.
78. For discussion of these remedial policy goals, see text accompanying notes
65-76 supra.
79. Cf. Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts of America, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 65 (E.D. Pa. 1975)
(general modes of proof appropriate in light of policy underlying cause of action).
See also Class Actions, supra note 18, at 1509-11 (discussion of Ungar).
80. See, e.g., Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 907 (9th Cir. 1975); Reeder v.
Mastercraft Elecs. Corp., 363 F. Supp. 574, 581 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Siegel v. Realty Equities Corp., 54 F.R.D. 420, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). In general, the erosion of the reliance element is a result of courts' concern with not only compensating those injured
by securities law violations but also enhancing the proscriptive effect of the regulation itself. While interest in deterrence does not always justify using general
modes of proof of the reliance element, use of these modes to establish reliance is
particularly appropriate in two instances: (1) To deter fraud effected through an impersonal market; and (2) to deter fraud based on nondisclosure. Note, The Reliance
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the stock exchange may not be aware of or directly rely on a specific false representation, it may nevertheless artificially inflate the
price of the security. Inflation results whenever others purchase
in reliance on the false information, since these additional sales
drive the price of the stock upward. 8 As a result of both the
courts' recognition of this market impact and the policy objective of
preventing it, specific modes of proof are not required.8 2 Rather,
cause-in-fact may be established by "proof that the deception influenced only enough individuals to have produced the adverse effect."83 This, in turn, can be established by proof that the deception was material, i.e., that a reasonable investor would attach
importance to the misrepresentation. 84
In the context of express warranties for products, as in the
case of securities fraud, significant misrepresentations can adversely
affect the market. 85 For example, if a seller falsely affirms through
mass advertising that a product will last for ten years, in comparison with similar products that can last for only five, and if
many, though not all, consumers rely on that affirmation in
purchasing the product, the producer is able to charge a higher
Requirement in PrivateActions Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 88 HARV. L. REv. 584 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Reliance Requirement in Private 10b-5 Actions]. See generally
R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SEcuRrriEs REGULAnTIONS 1060-71 (4th ed. 1971); Note,

The Impact of Class Actions on Rule 10b-5, 38 U. Cm.L. REv. 337, 345-56 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as The Impact of Class Actions].
81. In Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975), the court held:
A purchaser on the stock exchanges may be either unaware of a specific
false representation, or may not directly rely on it; he may purchase because
of a favorable price trend, price earnings ratio, or some other factor. Nevertheless, he relies generally on the supposition that the market price is validly set and that no unsuspected manipulation has artifically inflated the
price, and thus indirectly on the truth of the representations underlying the
stock price-whether he is aware of it or not, the price he pays reflects material misrepresentations.
Id. at 907.
82. See, e.g., Reeder v. Mastercraft Elecs. Corp., 363 F. Supp. 574 (S.D.N.Y.
1973) (since misrepresentation affected market, and damage to plaintiffs occurred
due to dealings in market, reliance presumed if misrepresentation material).
83. Reliance Requirement in Private10b-5 Actions, supra note 80, at 593.
84. Id. See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54
(1972); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 384 (1970). See generally Esplin
v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94 (10th Cir. 1968) (district court found issue of reliance in securities case individual question; circuit court held common elements predominate because, inter alia, misrepresentations identical).
85. See Owen, The Highly Blameworthy Manufacturer: Implications on Rules
of Liability and Defense in Products Liability Actions, 10 IND. L. REv. 769, 783
(1977). But see Strauss v. Long Island Sports, Inc., 60 A.D.2d 501, 401 N.Y.S.2d 233
(2d Dep't 1978).
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price than could have been charged if the true facts had been generally known. In such a case even a purchaser who did not personally rely on the false affirmation will have paid the inflated price
that resulted from the fact that others relied on it.
Preventing such fraud on the market should be viewed as a
main goal of breach of warranty actions. To further this goal, it is
appropriate to forego individual proof of reliance and to permit reliance to be shown by proof that the misrepresentation is material,
i.e., that the affirmation is such that a reasonable consumer would
rely on it in purchasing the product. Indeed, courts have been receptive to general modes of proof of this element in both common
law fraud actions and express warranty actions. 86
Breach of an implied warranty of merchantability presents an
instructive contrast. In these cases individual proof of reliance is
never required. 8 7 The defeated expectation that the product is fit
for ordinary purposes, though perhaps part of the harm, is not a
major concern. Nor is the concern the fraud on the market engendered by widespread expectations of merchantability. Rather, the
concern is to keep from the market products that are not fit for the
ordinary purposes for which they are used and thereby to protect
buyers and third parties from injury. 8 In light of this goal,
whether a particular purchaser in fact relied on the implied warranty is inconsequential. Courts have thus effectively abandoned
the reliance requirement and now presume that all consumers rely
on the merchantability of products on the market. 89
86. See, e.g., Collins v. Rocha, 7 Cal. 3d 232, 497 P.2d 225, 102 Cal. Rptr. 1
(1972); Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 484 P.2d 964, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796
(1971); Metowski v. Traid Corp., 28 Cal. App. 3d 332, 104 Cal. Rptr. 599 (Ct. App. 3d

Dist. 1972). See generally U.C.C. § 2-313, Comment 3; J. WHTrE & R. SUMIERS, SUpra note 65, § 9-4. Courts will likely be more receptive to general modes of proof of
reliance where the misrepresentation is intentional or reckless. Owen, supra note 85,
at 783. Cf. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (scienter element of private action under SEC rule 10b-5).
87. See, e.g., Vitro Corp. of America v. Texas Vitrified Supply Co., 71 N.M.
95, 106, 376 P.2d 41, 49 (1962); J. WHUE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 65, § 9-6, at 286.
Cf. U.C.C. § 2-315 (buyer must, in fact, rely on seller's skill or judgment in order for
implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose to apply); J. WHrTE & R. SUMMERS,
supra note 65, § 9-9.
88. See note 72 supra.
89. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 464-65, 150 P.2d 436,
443 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring). Cf. Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 907 (9th
Cir. 1975) (buyer of securities "relies generally on the supposition that the market
price is validly set and that no unsuspected manipulation has artificially inflated the
price"). See generally Green, Strict Liability, supra note 47, at 1190; Whitford, supra
note 48, at 93 n.36.
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The failure-to-warn cases are different from the warranty
cases because there is no affirmative misrepresentation, express or
implied. Instead, there is a nondisclosure. Since reliance typically requires both belief in the truth of the misrepresentation and action
based on that belief,90 and since in the case of nondisclosure nothing has been affirmatively represented, to demand proof of reliance
"'would require the plaintiff to demonstrate that he had in mind
the
converse of the omitted facts, which would be virtually impossible
to demonstrate in most cases." 91 To require plaintiff to prove reliance when it cannot be proved obviously frustrates the policy objectives behind requiring a warning in the first place. It seems rea2
sonable, therefore, that such proof should be unnecessary. 9
The courts have adopted this approach. Where the failure to
warn increases the risk of injury, proof of reliance-in the strict
sense of having in mind the converse of the omitted fact-is not required; plaintiff is, however, required to prove causation by showing that had the risk been known he or she would not have exposed himself or herself to it.93 Recognizing that this, too, is
difficult to prove, courts have dealt with the problem by permitting
general modes of proof. Plaintiff either is given the benefit of a rebuttable presumption that the consumer would have read a required warning had it been given and acted so as to minimize the
risks, 94 or is allowed to establish cause-in-fact by using the reason90.

W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 108, at 714-15 (4th ed. 1971).

91. Reliance Requirement in Private 10b-5 Actions, supra note 80, at 590. See
also Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 382 n.5 (1970); Titan Group, Inc.
v. Faggen, 513 F.2d 234, 239 (2d Cir. 1975); 2 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SEcul aTEs FBAuD & CoMMoDiTIs FRAuD § 8.6 (1979); Note, The Nature and Scope
of the Reliance Requirement in PrivateActions Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 24 CASE W.
RES. L. REv. 363, 379-80 (1973).
92. Securities fraud actions again offer a useful parallel. Recognizing the difficulty of proving reliance in nondisclosure cases and the importance of the policies
frustrated by insisting on proof that a specific individual relied on the omission,
courts permit reliance to be established by general modes of proof. Specifically, reliance is presumed where the nondisclosure is deemed material, i.e., where a reasonable investor might have considered the information important in making his or her
decision to purchase the stock. See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406
U.S. 128 (1972); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970); Shapiro v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974); Reeder v.
Mastercraft Elecs. Corp., 363 F. Supp. 574 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). See generally Reliance
Requirement in Private 10b-5 Actions, supra note 80, at 590-92.
93. See, e.g., Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974); Cunningham
v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 532 P.2d 1377 (Okla. 1974); Technical Chem. Co. v. Jacobs,
480 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. 1972). Cf. List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir.
1965) (causation in securities fraud dependent upon "whether the plaintiff would
have been influenced to act differently than he did act if the defendant had disclosed to him the undisclosed fact").
94. E.g., Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., 498 F.2d 1264, 1281 (5th Cir. 1974); Cunning-
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ably prudent person standard (Would a reasonably prudent9 person,
5
knowing of the risk, have exposed himself or herself to it?).
Where the manufacturer's liability for failure to warn is based
not on the increased risk of injury created but on the consumer's
interest in informed consent, 96 policy considerations warrant abandonment of the causation element altogether. This is because the
goal in informed consent cases is not to prevent injury caused by
nondisclosure but rather to prevent the nondisclosure itself-the
denial of the individual's right to make an informed choice. As Professor Twerski has observed, in failure-to-warn cases that belong
more to the law of "informed consent" than to the law of products
liability,
once the informational dimension is found lacking, it becomes
possible to impose liability without wrenching over the impossibly difficult causation issue. The issue in battery is not whether
but for the failure to warn the plaintiff would not have taken the
drug; but rather, whether plaintiff was subjected to an unconsented touching. If the defendant failed to adequately inform
plaintiff, then the administration of the drug was a battery on
the part of the drug manufacturer, and consequently the causa97
tion issue need not be pursued.
In sum, 'with respect to the various types of defective communications in products liability, the element of reliance either should
not be required, or, if it is, should be permitted to be established
by general modes of proof. Indeed, only in the case of express warranties could the necessity for individual determinations of reliance
be plausibly advocated, and there only by narrowly viewing the remedial policy goals involved.
(b) The Cause-in-FactElement.-It has been well argued that
the requirement of causation in torts is explained not by compensation goals of cost spreading and wealth distribution but only by
ham v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 532 P.2d 1377, 1382 (Okla. 1974); Technical Chem.
Co. v. Jacobs, 480 S.W.2d 602, 606 (Tex. 1972). See also Reliance Requirement
in Private 10b-5 Actions, supra note 80, at 597-602 (use of rebuttable presumption
of reliance in securities fraud cases).
95. E.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 791 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Cobbs v.
Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 245, 502 P.2d 1, 11-12, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 515-16 (1972);
Cunningham v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 532 P.2d 1377, 1382 (Okla. 1974).
96. See text accompanying notes 74 & 75 supra.
97. Twerski, supra note 74, at 47 (footnote omitted). Cf. Mills v. Electric AutoLite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 385 (1970) (to effectuate policy goal of "informed choice" in
private action for violation of § 14(a) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Court rejected requirement that plaintiff prove defective communication caused submission
of proxy).
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goals of collective and market deterrence. 98 Specifically, the causein-fact element is needed with respect to market deterrence in order to allocate injury costs to a particular activity and thereby to
permit determination of a trade-off between safety and injury. 99 If
optimal deterrence is to be obtained, it is essential that the allocation of specific injury costs to specific activities create appropriate
incentives "to avoid injuries worth avoiding and not avoid those injuries that are too costly to eliminate."' 00 An allocation is accurate
when all those injury costs that are relevant to the choice between
injury and safety-and only those costs-are allocated to the activity in question.
The legal principle of but-for causation is one useful way of assuring accurate allocations of injury costs. 1 1 Under this principle
allocation of the cost of an injury to a particular activity is proper if
and only if it can be shown that the injury would not have
occurred but for that activity. 10 2 However, though thus justified
in functional terms, the but-for principle is often rigidly applied
by courts as if it were an absolute and goal-neutral require3
ment.' 0
In addition, the test has been criticized as more confusing
than clarifying, and as focusing the inquiry on an issue that is not
only different from and more difficult than cause-in-fact but
which may even be unresolvable.1 04 By precluding allocation of in98. Calabresi, supra note 1, at 73-90.
99. See id. at 84-87. Cause-in-fact also has a role in determining the "cheapest
cost avoider." Id. at 84; G. CALABBESI, supra note 48, at 140. For discussion of this
concept, see note 59 supra.
100. Calabresi, supra note 1, at 86.
101. Id. at 85. See Kiemme, The Enterprise Liability Theory of Torts, 47 U.
COLO. L. REv. 153, 163-65 (1976).
102. See W. PROSSER, supra note 90, § 41, at 237-39; Malone, Ruminations on
Cause-In-Fact,9 STAN. L. REv. 60, 65 (1956).
103. See KIemme, supra note 101, at 162-65.
With but a few recently developed and very limited exceptions . . . the rule
has been: no matter how tortious the defendant's conduct may have been
and no matter how long or how strongly a given loss has been considered
compensable, unless the plaintiff is able to persuade the fact finder by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant's activity was at least one of
the infinite "but for" causes of his losses, the plaintiff cannot recover.
Id. at 163 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). See generally Calabresi, supra
note 1, at 85, 105-08.
104. Green, The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 MIcH. L. REV.
543, 556 (1962). The but-for test is particularly unsatisfactory in products liability
cases. See Owen, supra note 85, at 779; Twerski, The Many Faces of Misuse: An Inquiry Into the Emerging Doctrine of Comparative Causation, 29 MERCER L. REv.
403, 414-16 (1978); Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, supra note 67, at 532-33.
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jury costs when the activity was a significant but not a sine qua non
cause of injury, the but-for test frustrates the policy goal it is intended to advance. 10 5 Recognition of this problem has led courts in
certain instances to reject the but-for test as the way to achieve accurate allocation of injury costs. 106
As an alternative to the but-for test these courts have employed the "substantial factor" test. When the latter is used as the
measure of cause-in-fact, a defendant's conduct is regarded as the
cause of the damage, though the same loss may have occurred
without it. It is enough to show that defendant's conduct substantially increased the risk of the type of harm suffered. 10 7 Some commentators find even the substantial factor test too restrictive. They
would require plaintiff to show only that defendant's conduct contributed to the victim's injury.' 0 8 In either case it is "doubtful
whether blind adherence to the requirement that the victim prove
a but for relationship [always] serves the purposes of market deterrence."109

Not only may the but-for requirement thus be abandoned, but
it is questionable whether case-by-case determination of the causein-fact of every injury is the most efficient way of allocating injury
105. For one court's recognition that the but-for requirement can prevent a
proper allocation, see Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel, 3 Cal. 3d 756, 775 n.20, 478 P.2d
465, 477 n.20, 91 Cal. Rptr. 745, 757 n.20 (1970).
106. See, e.g., Michie v. Great Lakes Steel, 495 F.2d 213 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 997 (1975) (group of polluters held liable, though harm attributable
to each could not be shown); Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417, 429 (2d Cir.
1969) (but-for test "will not work ... in the situation where two independent forces
concur to produce a result which either of them alone would have produced"); Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948) (impossible to determine which of two
negligent defendants but-for cause of plaintiff's injury; both liable); Anderson v.
Minneapolis, St. P. & S.St.M. Ry., 146 Minn. 430, 179 N.W. 45 (1920) (joint liability
where fire set by engine of one railroad company united with fire set by engine of
another company, though either fire alone would have destroyed plaintiff's property). See W. PRossE., supra note 90, § 41, at 239-41; Malone, supra note 102, at 88-97.
107. Owen, supra note 85, at 779. See, e.g., Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel, 3 Cal. 3d
756, 478 P.2d 465, 91 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1970) (failure to provide lifeguard "greatly enhanced" chances of drowning); Reynolds v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 37 La. Ann. 694 (1885)
(failure to light stairway greatly multiplied chances of accident to plaintiff). See generally F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 72, § 28.7. This concept of causation is
sometimes referred to as "causal linkage." Owen, supra note 85, at 779. "[T]he concept of causal linkage between acts and activities and injuries is no more than an expression of empirically based belief that the act or activity in question will, if repeated in the future, increase the likelihood that the injury under consideration will
also occur." Calabresi, supra note 1, at 72.
108. E.g., Green, supra note 104, at 557.
109. Calabresi, supra note 1, at 87 (emphasis in original). See Malone, supra
note 102, at 88-89.
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costs. Allocating costs on a more general basis may be just as accurate and far less expensive than the case-by-case approach.1 10
Once it is realized that accurate allocation of injury costs is
possible without proof that an activity was the sine qua non cause
of injury-or even a substantial factor in each particular case-new
avenues to reach the goal of optimal deterrence are opened. Use of
general- modes of proof to establish cause-in-fact is one possibility.
For instance, a victim might be allowed to establish that a defective product was the cause-in-fact of his or her injury by offering as
evidence reliable scientific studies indicating a high correlation between injury of the type suffered and the defective product.11
Use of general modes of proof with respect to cause-in-fact
would be particularly appropriate if it were impossible to ascertain
what weight to assign each factor that contributes to an individual's injury. For example, the degree to which a contracted disease
was caused by a defective drug-as opposed to other factors having nothing to do with the defective drug, e.g., other drugs or poor
112
diet-may be impossible to determine on an individual basis.
Yet, the study of many persons over an extended period of time
may provide a reliable conclusion that in any given instance

110. Calabresi, supra note 1, at 86. Cf. Landers, supra note 30, at 867-68
(classwide calculation of damages may be more accurate than amount computed from
individual determinations). See generally G. CALABRESI, supra note 48, at 202-03,

258-59. See also id. at 251, 255-58.
111. See, e.g., Development, Mass Accidents/Diseases, 4 CLASS AcT.REP. 127,
128 (1975). Use of statistical evidence would not be novel. This type of evidence has
become commonly accepted in tort law for determining cause-in-fact on an individual basis. See, e.g., Kallenberg v. Beth Israel Hosp., 45 A.D.2d 177, 357 N.Y.S.2d 508
(1st Dep't 1974) (medical testimony that if properly treated, plaintiff would have had
20% to 40% chance of survival); Hamil v. Bashline, 224 Pa. Super. 407, 307 A.2d 57
(Super. Ct. 1973) (medical testimony that 75% chance plaintiff would have survived
if had received proper and prompt treatment). Moreover, "[rjeliance on statistical
methods of proof is common in discrimination suits." Note, Beyond the Prima Facie
Case in Employment DiscriminationLaw: StatisticalProof and Rebuttal, 89 HARV.

L. REv. 387, 387 (1975). In particular, statistical inference in an employment discrimination class action can be used "to determine, by observing the outcomes of an employer's decisions, the factors causing them." Id. at 394 (emphasis added).
112.

See Askeland v. A.H. Robins Co., No. 330633, slip op. at 7-8 (Cal. Super.

Ct. Feb. 7, 1978). "I couldn't tell what instigated the PID [pelvic inflammatory disease] in this patient, whether it was the IUD or it was other factors before, I have no
way of discerning or determining. I do know she did have PID, and I do feel that
the IUD, whatever type they are, promulgated such infections." Id. (emphasis
added) (quoting medical expert). Compare id. with text accompanying notes 90-95
supra (when proof on an individual basis is difficult or impossible, general modes of

proof allowed).
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there is a ninety-percent probability the injury was caused by the
defective product. In such a case, to require individual modes of
proof would result in plaintiff's failure to carry the burden of production on the causation issue; consequently the injury cost would
not be allocated to the defective product. This would occur even
though a ninety-percent probability that the defective drug was indeed the cause of the injury seems to warrant allocation of costs to
that product. Moreover, even if the burden of production on the
causation question could be met on an individual basis, a more accurate determination of cause might be a determination based on statistical proof encompassing a multitude of cases.1 13
The accuracy of general modes of proof in fulfilling the
allocative function would be higher still if use of such modes were
accompanied by use of comparative cause-in-fact.1 1 4 Then, statistical proof that a product has a ninety-percent probability of
causing the injury in question would result in only ninety percent,
rather than all, of the relevant"15 injury costs being allocated to the
product. If all appropriate cases were litigated, this would result in
ninety percent of all relevant injury costs being allocated to the defective product, exactly the percentage that should be allocated under market deterrence principles.
In sum, cause-in-fact can be established in many cases by general modes of proof. In these cases there can be full compatibility
between class actions and the structural policy goals of products liability law.
113. See S. BARKER, THE ELEMiENTs OF LOGIC 221 (1965); I. COPI, INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC 327, 421-22 (3d ed. 1968). See generally S. BARKER, supra, at
212-72; I. Copi, supra, at 322-72. Resolution of cause-in-fact is affected by several

"extraneous" factors. These include the physical appearance of the individual plaintiff, the quality of the individual plaintiff's counsel, and the sympathies and
idiosyncracies of different juries and judges. The operation of extraneous factors in
each individual case affects the overall allocation of injury costs. If cause-in-fact is
resolved on a classwide basis, the influence of these factors is restricted and the resuiting allocation may well be more accurate.
114. See Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 731-43, 575 P.2d 1162,
1165-73, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 383-91 (1978) (comparative principles held to apply in
strict liability actions); Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 395 A.2d 843, 848-50 (N.H.
1978) (principle of comparative causation applied in strict liability case); General
Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344, 352 (Tex. 1977) (plaintiff's recovery in
products liability action limited "to that portion of his damages equal to the percentage of the cause contributed by the product defect"); Twerski, supra note 104, at
413-14; Twerski, The Use and Abuse of ComparativeNegligence in Products Liability, 10 IND. L. REv. 797, 819-29 (1977).
115. See note 63 supra.
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3. Interaction of Remedial and Structural Policies.-Although
it is reasonable to use general modes of proof in a products liability
cause of action, the danger exists, especially in a class action, that
this will impede achievement of the underlying remedial policies. 116 Some plaintiffs who did not rely upon an express warranty
or who would have exposed themselves to the risk of injury even
had a warning been given, as well as some plaintiffs whose injury
may not have been substantially related to the defective product
involved, will recover where otherwise they would not. The result
is overdeterrence: Injury costs are allocated to an activity when
they should not be. The threat of overdeterrence, in turn, may
cause manufacturers to protect themselves by refraining not only
from socially inefficient activity but also from activity that is socially desirable.
This risk of overdeterrence, however, may be less significant
than the risk of underdeterrence that would arise if individualized

proof of causation is required. Not only would injury costs of
those plaintiffs who cannot meet the more individualized standards
fail to be allocated to the manufacturing activity, but so would the
costs of plaintiffs who could have met the standards but were prevented from doing so because of the high costs involved in individual litigation. 117
Moreover, there are ways courts can protect against overdeterrence. First, they can use the causation question in an
"accordion-like fashion," being strict or liberal in letting the causation question go to the jury depending upon the policy factors involved. 118 If the product in question is of low social utility, courts
should show little patience with efforts of defendants to question
the sufficiency of proof on cause-in-fact and need not worry about
overdeterrence. For example, if studies show a seventy-percent likelihood that a product caused the injuries allegedly connected with its use, that could be deemed sufficient to allocate the
injury costs to production of the product. On the other hand, if the
product is of high social utility, it would be appropriate to weigh
the possibility of overdeterrence more carefully and as a result to
116. Cf.Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 48 (1972) (overcompensation or undercompensation occurs when "average figure" standard used for
determination of damages). But see Landers, supra note 30, at 868-69.
117. Cf. Reliance Requirement in Private 10b-5 Actions, supra note 80, at
590-91 (risk of overcompensation in private action under rule 10b-5 less significant
than risk of undercompensation that arises if proof of reliance required).
118. Twerski, supra note 104, at 410. See Malone, supra note 102, at 72-88.
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require a showing that the causal connection be of an eighty- or
even ninety-percent likelihood.' 1 9
In addition to the social utility of the product, a policy factor
to be considered is the moral culpability or blameworthiness of the
defendant. If the manufacturer intentionally or recklessly misrepresents the facts or markets an unreasonably dangerous product, the
be less deficausal link required to establish cause-in-fact should
0
nite than if the manufacturer is merely negligent.12
Second, overdeterrence could be reduced by allowing defendants to produce individualized evidence to show that the generalized proof does not apply to a particular class member-that the
defendant's activity was not a substantial factor in causing injury to
this class member, 21 ' or that this member did not rely on the manufacturer's misrepresentation. 12 2 Such an individual could be exhis or her damage award
cluded from the class,12 3 or, alternatively,
12 4
reduced.
correspondingly
be
could
B.

Substantive Predomination

In the preceding sections, it is shown that in many instances
substantive policy goals of a products liability cause of action, both
remedial and structural, are fully compatible with class action procedures. If full compatibility exists, the predomination requirement
is satisfied and, all other section 901(a) requirements being met,
the class should be certified. The absence of full compatibility,
however, does not necessarily imply that a class action suit is inappropriate. It only indicates the need to proceed to a second level of
analysis, the objective of which is to determine whether class procedures are fair in light of the overall policy goals and values underlying the substantive law upon which the cause of action is
based.
As an example of this level of analysis, consider a case in
which the conclusion of a first-level analysis is that cause-in-fact re119. The possibility of overdeterrence is dramatically reduced by the use of
comparative cause-in-fact. See text accompanying notes 114 & 115 supra.
120. See Owen, supra note 85, at 780-84.
121. See Development, supra note 111, at 129-30.
122. See U.C.C. § 2-313, Comment 3; J. WHITE & R. SummnEius, supra note 65,
§ 9-4, at 279. Cf. Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402, 410 (3d Cir. 1973) (presumption of reliance in securities case rebuttable). See also Reliance Requirement in
Private 10b-5 Actions, supra note 80, at 597-602. Shifting the burden of proof in this
manner is not unusual in tort law. See note 128 infra.
123. See N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW § 906(2) (McKinney 1976). For text of § 906, see
note 8 supra.
124. See Malone, supra note 102, at 80-81; sources cited note 114 supra.
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quires individualized modes of proof in order to ensure accurate allocation of injury costs to the manufacturer. Class modes of procedure are not, by hypothesis, fully compatible with the structural
policies of products liability law. Class action might be substantively fair, nevertheless, for it might be the procedural arrangement most likely to achieve the best overall balance of the social
goals and values underlying the substantive law of products liability. And if class action would be substantively fair, the predomination requirement is satisfied.
A conclusion that class action is substantively fair despite a
prior decision that individual determinations of cause-in-fact are required is a decision that the value(s) associated with cause-in-fact
ought to remain to some extent unsatisfied in order to promote
other values of the cause of action more deserving of judicial protection. The value sought to be furthered by the cause-in-fact element is accurate allocation of injury costs. 125 In the present context
the assumption is that the most accurate allocation is achieved by
individualized proof of cause-in-fact. Accuracy of allocation, however, is capable of being satisfied, at least to some extent, by use of
general modes of proof. The fairness of using these general modes,
even at the loss of some accuracy in allocation of injury costs, depends upon four factors: (1) The existence of competing.values, the
achievement of which is at stake in the class certification decision;
(2) the importance of these other values relative to the value of accurate allocation; (3) the extent to which these other values are impaired in the absence of class suit; and (4) the extent to which accuracy is impaired if injury costs are allocated on the basis of
general modes of proof. If values equal to or of greater importance
than accurate allocation are realized only by class action, and if
general modes of proof do not seriously impair the accuracy of the
injury cost allocation, class action is substantively fair.
One of the other values to be considered in this balancing test
is the value of complete compensation. This is achieved if and only
if every consumer or third party whose injury is caused by the defective product is fully compensated. Yet it is the nature of products liability cases that without a class suit compensation is largely
incomplete. 126 Therefore, if compensation for injury is considered a
125. For a brief definition of accurate allocation of injury costs, see text following note 100 supra.
126. See text accompanying note 29 supra. In some instances, however, compensation can be increased by methods other than class action. See Hall v. Coburn
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value equal to or of greater importance than accurate allocation of
injury costs, and if reliable general modes of proof are available for
determining cause-in-fact, then these modes should be used even
though such a cost allocation is, by hypothesis, less accurate than it
would be with individualized modes of proof. Yielding some precision in allocating injury costs to provide complete compensation
produces an overall result that is substantively fair. 12 7 Trade-offs of
28
this kind are nothing new to the law of torts.1
Thus, although use of general modes of proof would reduce
the weight given to the value of accuracy of injury cost allocation,
it would further the overall goals of the cause of action by making
classwide determination of cause-in-fact and, consequently class
certification, possible. Cause-in-fact-by hypothesis, an individual
question-is transformed into a general question for the purpose of
29
achieving substantive fairness.'
In those cases in which the cause-in-fact issue cannot be transCorp. of America, 26 N.Y.2d 396, 404, 259 N.E.2d 720, 723, 311 N.Y.S.2d 281, 286

(1970) (administrative action by State Consumer Protection Board); Strauss v. Long
Island Sports, Inc., 60 A.D.2d 501, 511, 401 N.Y.S.2d 233, 238 (2d Dep't 1978)
(parens patriae proceeding initiated by New York State Attorney General).
127. Substantive predomination analysis does not imply judicial modification of
the elements of a cause of action by application of the procedural rules governing
class actions. Rather, what is proposed is judicial flexibility in setting standards of
modes of proof so as best to achieve the underlying policy goals of the relevant substantive law. Thus understood, substantive predomination analysis is not subject to
the criticism that, as applied to federal courts, it violates the Rules Enabling Act, 28
U.S.C. § 2072 (1976). See generally Landers, supra note 30, at 849-50; Ross, Rule
23(b) Class Actions-A Matter of "Practice and Procedure" or "Substantive Right"?,
27 EmonY L. J. 247 (1978); Class Actions, supra note 18, at 1358-59; The Impact of
Class Actions, supra note 80, at 337.
128. Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948), provides a well-known
example. Plaintiff suffered serious injury from a shot fired by one of two negligent
defendants. An accurate allocation of costs would require that damages be assessed
only against that defendant whose shot actually caused the injury. Since this could
not be determined, the court held that defendants, each of whom was negligent,
were jointly liable to plaintiff. Thus precision in allocation of injury costs was foregone so that the cost of the accident would be borne by negligent defendants rather
than by an innocent plaintiff. Accord, Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417 (2d
Cir. 1969); Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944). The court in
Summers emphasized that each defendant would have the opportunity to absolve
himself: The burden was on the wrongdoers to increase the accuracy of the allocation. 33 Cal. 2d at 86-88, 199 P.2d at 4-5. Accord, Hall v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours
& Co., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d
687 (1944); Paine v. Gamble Stores, Inc., 202 Minn. 462, 279 N.W. 257 (1938). The
approach suggested in this Note is in agreement with such a shift in the burden of
proof. See text accompanying notes 121-124 supra.
129. See generally Landers, supra note 30, at 865-74.
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formed into a general question, individual determinations are unavoidable. However, the need for individual determination of one or
more of the required elements of the cause of action does not necessarily preclude satisfaction of the predomination requirement.
Under the New York class action statute, so long as the element in
question can be proved by some procedural method other than a
full evidentiary hearing, common elements may still predominate. 130 For example, to resolve the issue of damages many authorities advocate using a variety of techniques-including reference to
masters, motions for summary judgment, and administrative processing of individual claims-that are compatible with substantive
policy goals, and that make determination on an individual basis
less burdensome than a full evidentiary hearing. 131 Conceivably,
determination of cause-in-fact is susceptible to some similar form of
32
mechanical resolution. 1

Use of any such method must, of course, be justified on
grounds of substantive fairness. Therefore any proposed method
must be shown to further the overall policy goals of products liabil130. Where a full evidentiary hearing is required for certain issues, there is no
reason to treat the matter as a plenary class actiorn, because the New York statute expressly provides for "partial class actions." N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 906 (McKinney
1976). See generally text accompanying notes 137-147 infra. There is little, if any,
practical difference between a § 906 partial class action and a § 901 plenary class action in which certain issues are severed for individualized adjudication. Under the §
906 procedure, however, the class representative is spared the additional burden of
showing that common questions of law and fact predominate. N.Y. Civ. PhAc. LAW
§§ 901, 906 (McKinney 1976). See notes 2, 3 & 8 supra.
131. See Landers, supra note 30, at 874-79; Class Actions, supra note 18, at
1517-26. An excellent suggestion is that the court first identify the modes of procedure that make possible the most expeditious litigation of the class action; second,
determine if the most manageable procedures are compatible with the values reflected in the cause of action; and only then answer the predomination question. Id.
at 1504, 1511.
132. Perhaps a master could be used. Perhaps the class representative could
move for a directed verdict for any absent class member who furnished both an affidavit containing pertinent information needed to establish causation and, in addition,
supporting documentation. See Landers, supra note 30, at 876-79. For example, assume the only possible causes of injury X to be drugs A, B and C. The class member
could furnish an affidavit that only drug A--the one alleged to be defective-was ingested during the time period in question. The class member could also be required
to offer a statement and documentation by the attending physician that only drug A
had been prescribed, and by the relevant pharmacist that only drug A had been sold
to him or her. Perhaps, even where other possible causes could not be definitely
ruled out, unqualified expert statements by the physicans involved that the defective
product was a substantial factor in the injury would suffice to establish, prima facje,
cause-in-fact. The directed verdict should be granted to any class member who
supplied the documentation, unless the defendant filed a counter-affidavit that raised
a material issue of fact.
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ity law. Accordingly, the costs of these altered procedures would
need to be considered. If, for example, attorneys' fees and administrative costs so depleted the recovery fund that relief to class members would be insignificant,13 3 the compensation goal would be
thwarted, and the substantive fairness of the class suit would be
correspondingly reduced. However, even in this situation, class action may still be justified as furthering deterrence goals. Inasmuch
as the injury costs would be allocated to the class opponentmanufacturer, the manufacturer would be induced to lower these
34
costs by making the product reasonably safe.'
The outcome of the substantive predomination analysis thus
may be that even though cause-in-fact requires individualized
modes of proof, defeating substantive compatibility requirements,
common elements nevertheless predominate on the basis of substantive fairness. This outcome is warranted by a finding that resolution of cause-in-fact by general modes of proof or altered procedural methods is substantively fair.
IV.

PARTIAL CLASS ACTIONS

If substantive predomination, in addition to substantive compatibility, is found wanting, plenary class certification pursuant to
section 901 of the CPLR is precluded; still the question of partial
36
3
class action pursuant to section 906(1) of the CPLR1 s remains.'
This section provides that "[w]hen appropriate, an action may be
brought or maintained as a class action with respect to particular issues."

13 7

The problem, of course, is how to unpack the phrase "when
appropriate." In keeping with the general approach of a substantive
133. See, e.g., Cotchett v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 56 F.R.D. 549, 553
(S.D.N.Y. 1972); Handler, The Shift From Substantive to ProceduralInnovations in
Antitrust Suits-The Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 CoLum. L. REv. 1,
9-10 (1971).
134. It should be noted that most class suits are settled prior to trial. Thus minor doubt about the viability of general modes of proof or altered procedures should
not prevent class certification, for these methods will rarely be used. Landers, supra
note 30, at 880. See generally Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94, 101 (10th Cir. 1968)
(any error should be made in favor of maintaining class action in securities law context).
135. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAv § 906(1) (McKinney 1976). For text of § 906, see
note 8 supra.
136. In addition, the court always should consider the possibility of reshaping
the class pursuant to N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 906(2) (McKinney 1976). See FED. R.
CIv. P. 23(c)(4)(B).
137. N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW § 906(1) (McKinney 1976).
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theory of class actions, a key criterion should be whether the policies underlying the cause of action are furthered by class modes of
procedure with respect to the particular issue sought to be maintained as a class action. With this as the initial test, it is obvious
that any issue that prevented plenary class certification on grounds
of substantive incompatibility must be eliminated as a candidate for
partial class action.
Assuming that the issues of causation and damages were ruled
out as failing this initial requirement, the issue of product defect
would still remain. Does the determination of this issue for the entire class further the remedial and structural policy goals of a products liability cause of action?
Remedial policy goals are clearly advanced. The high cost of
litigation, which serves to frustrate compensation and market deterrence, is largely a result of the expense required to demonstrate
the existence and nature of a defective product or communication.
As Justice Shapiro observes in his dissenting opinion in Rosenfeld:
[P]roving the product's defect and the misleading nature of the
accompanying literature would require sophisticated proof which
might well be beyond the financial means of any individual
plaintiff.
• . . It cannot be denied that if defendant were to concede
that the shield was defective and that its literature did not sufficiently warn of the dangers, that the cost of litigation that would
be borne by each injured user of the shield would then be enormously decreased. 13 8
138. 63 A.D.2d at 33, 34, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 210 (Shapiro, J., dissenting). But see
id. at 20, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 201-02, See also id. at 32, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 209 (Shapiro, J.,
dissenting); Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 13, at 16. Justice Gulotta's argu-

ment that benefit to class members would be small is based in part on the availability of consolidated federal pretrial proceedings. In his opinion, class action in this in-

stance would not increase compensation. However, that the cost of proving product
defect is less than if there had been no federal proceedings does not mean that there
would be no increase of compensation through use of class modes of procedure. Justice Gulotta also mentions collateral estoppel as an alternative means of increasing
compensation-it would eliminate the expense of relitigating the defect issue. Yet, as
he himself recognized, it is uncertain whether collateral estoppel could successfully
be invoked in many multiple claimant situations. Id., 407 N.Y.S.2d at 202.
Although the New York courts have abandoned the requirement of "mutuality of

estoppel," see B.R. De Witt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 225 N.E.2d 195, 278
N.Y.S.2d 596 (1967); Schwartz v. Public Adm'r, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 246 N.E.2d 725, 298
N.Y.S.2d 955 (1969), the courts scrutinize any situation where collateral estoppel is
asserted by a person who was neither a party, nor in privity with a party to the original case, especially in a situation-inherent in products liability-where there are

multiple claimants. See Vincent v. Thompson, 50 A.D.2d 211, 377 N.Y.S.2d 118 (2d
Dep't 1975). See generally Winters v. Lavine, 574 F.2d 46, 58 n.14 (2d Cir. 1978);
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Structural policy goals likewise are furthered, since whether
the product is defective appears amenable to general modes of
proof. Yet the argument of Justice Gulotta, writing for the majority
in Rosenfeld, is in effect that the defect issue fails to meet structural policy goals. More precisely, he argues that those issues that
could be resolved "on a class basis"' 39 -including (1) the nature of
the representations and warranties made with respect to the
product, (2) whether the warranties and representations are false,
and (3) the existence of product defecti 4 -- are "thoroughly intertwined with those which must be determined individually.' 41 The
odd result is that those issues professed by Justice Gulotta to be
resolvable on a class basis are nevertheless held by him to be inappropriate issues for partial class action.
Regrettably, Justice Gulotta did not explain how the issues
were "thoroughly intertwined," and one can only speculate that
Rosenberg, Collateral Estoppel in New York, 44 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 165, 185-95
(1969); Annot., 31 A.L.R.3d 1044 (1970). In any case, in order to assert successfully
collateral estoppel, "[t]here must be an identity of issue which has necessarily been
decided in the prior action and is decisive of the present action, and ... there must
have been a full and fair opportunity to contest the decision now said to be
controlling." Schwartz v. Public Adm'r, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 71, 246 N.E.2d 725, 729, 298
N.Y.S.2d 955, 960 (1969). Factors weighed in a determination whether the "full and
fair opportunity" test has been met include: (1) Size of the claim in the prior litigation, (2) prejudice because of the forum of the earlier action, (3) the availability of
new evidence, (4) influence in the earlier action of extraneous factors such as sympathy or prejudice, (5) competence and experience of the original counsel, (6) difference in the applicable law, and (7) foreseeability of future litigation. See Winters v.
Lavine, 574 F.2d 46, 58 n.14 (2d Cir. 1978); Schwartz v. Public Adm'r, 24 N.Y.2d 65,
71, 246 N.E.2d 725, 729, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955, 961 (1969). Products cases that warrant
class certification are precisely those that involve relatively small claims. Therefore,
even if the other criteria are satisfied, it may be that the claim involved is too small
to satisfy the "full and fair opportunity" test, which in turn makes application of collateral estoppel inappropriate.
Even in cases where collateral estoppel is permitted, compensation is increased
by class action. With the use of collateral estoppel there are additional costs involved
in the resolution, in each case, of the collateral estoppel issue. Further costs will be
incurred in situations in which the defect issue is litigated repeatedly before a plaintiff is successful. Most important, it is the premise of the substantive theory of class
action that no individual claimant has sustained injury sufficiently extensive to warrant the expense associated with being the first to litigate the defect issue. If individual litigation is in the first instance unfeasible, there will be no decision that the defendant can be estopped from denying in subsequent cases.
139. 63 A.D.2d at 16, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 199.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 20, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 201. Also mentioned was the issue of judicial
economy, see id., but on the substantive theory judicial economy-administrative
cost-is not a separate criterion, but rather must be considered in relation to all the
substantive goals of the cause of action. See notes 18, 36 & 64 supra.
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with regard to the product-defect issue he had in mind something like misuse of product. The argument would be that evidence
of an individual plaintiff's misuse of the product may be used to
disprove the allegation that the product is defective. Hence the
product, although defective with regard to one plaintiff, may be
reasonably safe with regard to another. 142 If this is Justice Gulotta's
concern, then he has placed undue emphasis on the particular product's use in determining, through risk-utility analysis, whether a
product is unreasonably dangerous. While the immediate use of
the product and the particular injury are what trigger inquiry into
whether the product is unreasonably dangerous, that inquiry encompasses the total design of the product and risks other than the
43
one suffered by the particular plaintiff.1
Regardless of what the Rosenfeld court had in mind, it has
been forcefully argued by a distinguished group of engineers and
law professors that a comprehensive product description, divorced
from the atmosphere of the injury-creating event and unobscured
by the causation question, should be "the cornerstone of the product liability trial."' 144 They propose for all products cases a seriated
trial "in which the product is first tried before the jury on the
question of whether or not the product itself, apart from any considerations arising from the injury-producing event, is defective
and unreasonably dangerous.'

1 45

Though there may be cases in

which "the issues of defect, technical causation, and causation in
fact are inextricably intertwined technically,"'146 there is no reason
to believe that this is usually the case. Nor does it mean that the
product-defect issue cannot be severed from the legal-cause evidence, which, in contrast to the defect evidence, "focuses upon the
47
whole panoply of events linking product failure to injury."'1
In short, contrary to the opinion of Justice Gulotta, the
product-defect issue is substantively compatible with class action
procedures. It is not "thoroughly intertwined" with those issues
that must be determined individually, and therefore general modes
of proof are appropriate. In addition, remedial goals of compensa142.

See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344, 349 (Tex.

1977).
143.

Twerski, supra note 104, at 418.

144. Weinstein, Twerski, Piehler & Donaher, Product Liability: An Interaction
of Law & Technology, 12 DUQ. L. REv. 425, 437 (1974).
145. Id. at 446.
146. Id. at 448 (emphasis added).
147. Id.
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tion and market deterrence are furthered by class treatment of this

particular issue. It follows that the issue meets the appropriateness
standard of section 906 and is, therefore, suitable for partial class
action.
V.

CONCLUSION

This Note outlines an overall approach to the predomination
requirement in a products liability context. The approach needs to
be fleshed out by application to a variety of product-accident situations.1 48 Further, the analysis needs to be expanded. For example,
the approach to tort law in this Note has been predominately an
economic one. What are the consequences for the substantive
theory of class action if a moral conception of liability is more
strongly relied on?' 49 And, under 5 0either model, how would the
proximate cause issue be analyzed?
This analysis does, however, provide a first step toward justifying class certification in most products liability cases. It suggests
that classwide resolution of cause-in-fact is permissible in light of
the goals sought to be achieved by products liability law. If
classwide resolution of this issue is allowed, a major obstacle toward satisfying the predomination requirement is removed.
Zachary Alan Starr
148. For discussion of the importance of considering the particular productaccident situation in order to achieve optimal resource allocation, see Calabresi &
Bass, supra note 59, at 83-87.
149. For example, moral considerations would have been more strongly relied
on if products liability had been viewed in this Note as predominately a system of
collective deterrence. See G. CALABRESI, supra note 48, at 100-02. For the position
that the purpose of liability rules should be to achieve justice between the parties
and not maximum social utility, see Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85
HARv. L. REv. 537 (1972).
150. For discussion of the role of proximate cause in achieving tort goals, see
Calabresi, supra note 1.
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